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Introduction
This paper considers a general noisy rational expectations model of the CARAGaussian class where traders receive both a signal about the asset payo¤ and a shock to their endowment, both private information. We characterize the linear partially revealing equilibria of the model and show how public and private learning from prices drives the strategic character of the actions (substitutes or complements) of investors. The model uni…es and generalizes the models received in the literature.
The presence of multiple equilibria has proved important to explain crises and crashes (e.g., Gennote and Leland (1990) ), as well as showing the possibility of strategic complementarity in information acquisition. However, in traditional rational expectations models with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Hellwig (1980) , Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , Admati (1985) , Vives (1995) , see ch. 4 in Vives (2008) for an overview) there exists a unique linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium. An exogenously more informative price makes rational investors put less weight on their private signal and generates a response which makes the equilibrium price less informative. 1 There is aggregate strategic susbtitutability in the actions of informed investors and this implies that the equilibrium is unique. Moreover, stock prices are always more informative when more investors with private information (about the liquidation value) trade. This implies that private information is less valuable, and hence, traders have less incentives to get informed as the fraction of informed traders increases. In short, there is strategic substitutability in information acquisition. In this paper we want to explore the drivers of aggregate strategic susbtitutability or complementarity, and therefore the conditions for multiplicity, as well as the links with the incentives to acquire information.
Our model incorporates two essential features of modern trading in a …nan-cial market. First, traders receive typically multidimensional private signals about asset payo¤s and aggregate risk factors. For example, the individual exposure of an investor to an aggregate risk factor is typically his private information. The aggregate risk factor may be a stock or derivatives index, a housing price index, or a wage index. A risk averse investor will have an incentive to hedge his exposure to such aggregate risks. The risk factor may be also an aggregate liquidity shock. Second, the aggregate private information of traders about the asset payo¤ typically does not reveal its liquidation value, there is residual uncertainty. Furthermore, the model we propose avoids the need for noise traders, and relies only on rational traders. Nevertheless, our framework is similar to an economy with private information on noisy supply.
We build a model of the CARA-Gaussian family with these features which has as particular cases the main extant models in the literature. In our economy a trader receives an endowment shock, which is his private information about the aggregate endowment shock. An informed trader receives also a private sig-nal about the asset payo¤ with error term which is potentially correlated with the error terms of the signals of other traders. This correlation may arise if private signals are based on a common information source. 2 With correlated signals the collective information of informed investors does not reveal the asset value, that is, there is residual uncertainty. Furthermore, the signal correlation allows us to parameterize the degree of asymmetric information among informed traders. This generalizes the models in the literature: Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) assume that informed investors observe the same signal about the liquidation value (perfectly correlated private signals errors); in contrast, Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , or Hellwig (1980) assume that private signal errors are uncorrelated. As we will see the assumption of uncorrelation among private signal errors conditions some results. 3 Our results are as follows. We obtain that when private signal noises among informed traders are correlated the existence of a linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium is guaranteed, with the possibility of multiple equilibria (in such a case typically three). Strong strategic complementarity in actions of investors is the driver of potential multiplicity of equilibria. In our model because of the presence of multiple sources of private information there is both a private and a public learning channel from prices (as in Medrano and Vives (2004) and Amador and Weill (2010) ). The private learning channel arises because an investor uses his own exposure to the aggregate risk factor to improve his estimate of the asset payo¤ when looking at the price. Then an increase in the informativeness of the price about the asset payo¤ generates two e¤ects. First, a trader …nds optimal to rely more on the information provided by the private channel. This tends to make investors' actions strategic complements, that is, when other investors'demands rely more on their private information, a trader has more incentives to rely more on his private information. Second, a trader …nds optimal to rely more on the improved public information and less on the private information. This classical channel tends to make investors'actions strategic substitutes, when other investors'demands rely more on their private information, a trader has less incentives to rely on his private information. Which of the two e¤ects dominates depends on parameter values. However, for an investor who has no information on the asset payo¤ strategic complementarity prevails. We obtain that when, on aggregate, actions are either strategic substitutes or moderate strategic complements, the equilibrium is unique. Thus, a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is strong strategic complementarities in actions, if this happens at relevant points then the condition is su¢ cient.
The forces that push for a low degree of strategic complementarity and uniqueness of equilibrium therefore, are parameter constellations where the private learning channel from prices is weak (and we approach a situation with a unique source of asymmetric information). Those are when the fraction of informed traders about the asset payo¤ is large and the correlation among the private signal errors is high, or when investors almost do not hold information about the aggregate supply, or when informed investors about the asset payo¤ have a low risk weighted information advantage.
With correlated signals when strategic complementarity in actions is moderate the equilibrium is unique; when it is strong (at relevant points) then we have three equilibria. Only the middle equilibrium in the multiple equilibria situation displays strategic complementarity in information acquisition. However, it is unstable with respect to adaptive dynamics. In this sense the …nding of strategic susbtitutability in information acquisition of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. 4 There is an extensive literature on rational expectations models with asymmetric information. Several extensions of the models proposed by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) show the possibility of multiple equilibria 5 and the possibility of strategic complementarity in information acquisition. Lundholm (1988) extends the rational expectations competitive model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) , assuming that each investor receives both a public and a private signal. He proves the existence of a symmetric linear rational expectations equilibrium, with the possibility of multiplicity of such equilibria. 6 Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) show that when fundamentals and noise trading are correlated the existence of multiple equilibria and strategic complementarity in information acquisition may arise. 7 Ganguli and Yang (2009) consider a variation of the model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) where traders observe information about the aggregate supply of the stock and where private signals have uncorrelated error terms. They prove that a linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not exist. In case of existence (except for a set of parameters of measure zero), there are two of such 4 The only caveat is that there are some parameter constellations such that strategic substitutability in actions is so strong that the unique equilibrium is unstable. 5 An early analysis of multiplicity is McCa¤erty and Driskill (1980) . 6 The main focus of his paper is the analysis of some curious comparative statics results. More precisely, Lundholm shows that when public and private signals' errors are positive correlated, the equilibrium price of the risky asset may move inversely with a signal. This contrasts with the intuitive result derived in rational expectations models with one risky asset in which the equilibrium price of the risky security increases in the signals observed by investors (see, for instance, Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) ). 7 Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) propose a model with risk-neutral traders who face a borrowing constraint, in the presence of noise traders and where the fundamentals follow a binomial distribution. They claim that as more traders acquire private information prices need not become more informative and, consequently, investors may want to acquire more private information. However, Chamley (2008a) proves that the previous paper has a mistake in the expression for the value of information. Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) equilibria, in one equilibrium the market exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition, while in the other there is strategic substitutability. Our results show that the potential non-existence of equilibria in Ganguli and Yang's framework is not robust to small perturbations in the correlation coe¢ -cient of private signal errors. Medrano and Vives (2004) , Amador and Weill (2010) , and Hatchondo et al. (2010) explore the implications of the private learning channel from prices (respectively, on the welfare analysis of insider trading, on the welfare impact of public information, and on the ampli…cation e¤ect of aggregate exposure on asset prices) when individual exposures to an aggregate risk factor are private information. In our model, as in Amador and Weill (2010) , the strength of the private learning channel from prices is the source of strategic complementarity in actions. Goldstein et al. (2010) propose a model where the information revealed in the course of a speculative attack is used by the central bank in its policy decisions. Strategic complementarities among currency speculators arise due to the feedback e¤ect that the information in their trades has on the policy decision of the central bank.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the notation and the hypotheses of the model. Section 3 characterizes the symmetric linear equilibria in the general setup and analyzes existence, uniqueness/multiplicity and stability properties of equilibria. Comparative statics and information acquisition incentives are dealt with in Section 4 and some particular cases are analyzed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. Finally, proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
The model
Consider a static asset market model with di¤erential information, where a continuum of risk averse investors exchange a risky asset with liquidation value v N (v; submits a demand schedule X I (s i ; u i ; p), contingent on the private signal s i , on the endowment u i and on the price p. submits a demand schedule X U (u j ; p), contingent on the private endowment u j and on p.
Finally, assume that given u the average endowment shock reveals u, that is,
given v, the average signal satis…es
where e " = Some remarks on the model are in order:
1. We assume that private signals have correlated errors. This is equivalent to having signals with i.i.d. errors, but with a common shock (like in Grundy and McNichols (1989) , for example). 9 What we accomplish is that the aggregate signal does not reveal v and therefore there is residual uncertainty about the liquidation value. Still another related formulation would be to have i.i.d. errors in the signals, but then have a common shock to the liquidation value that is not observed (as in He and Wang (1995) , for example). Our formulation therefore should be considered the general case with parameterizing the common component of the shock in the signal residual uncertainty (from none with = 0 to a common signal with = 1).
2. Our information structure allows for a private learning channel from prices. This is so because u h is a private signal about the aggregate endowment for investor h. Although the endowments are independent of v, investors will …nd them useful when predicting v since they allow to disentangle part of the noise in the price coming from the aggregate endowment. In our economy investors have information about factors that are not related to payo¤s. In real markets, investors typically have not only information 8 We adopt the convention that the Strong Law of Large Numbers holds (see the thecnical appendix in Vives (2008) ). 9 Indeed, suppose that s i = v + e " + (" i e ") where e " N (0;
1 " ) and cov((" i e ") ; (" j e ")) = 0 with 2 [0; 1] for i 6 = j. about the payo¤s of assets but also about their exposure to some aggregate shock or risk factor. For example, investors may want to hedge their nontradable capital (say human capital) in the stock market. This hedging motive will be stronger the better the correlation of the returns of the non-tradable asset and the stock market. In some other cases traders may obtain information about noise trading or supply shocks. In any case those individual signals or exposure to aggregate risk will constitute private information to the trader and a source which will contribute to multidimensional information in the market (see, for example, Medrano 3. Finally, the model we propose avoids the need for noise traders, whose presence has often been criticized in the literature. Nevertheless, our framework is similar to an economy with private information on noisy supply. Concretely, a closely related framework consists in an economy where there are two types of agents: a continuum of rational investors and noise traders. The rational investors are endowed only with a certain amount of the riskless asset and no units of the risky asset. The aggregate supply of the risky asset is driven by noise traders. All the rational investors have private information about the supply of the risky asset and some of them have private information about the liquidation value of the risky asset. The results obtained in this alternative scenario will be similar to ours.
Equilibrium characterization
We de…ne …rst a rational expectations equilibrium and consider its implementation in a demand schedule game.
De…nition: A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of trades, contingent on the information that traders have,
o ; and a (measurable) price functional p(v + e "; u) (i.e., prices measurable in (v + e "; u)) such that i) markets clear: 
Traders understand the relationship between prices and the underlying uncertainty (v + e "; u): That is, they conjecture correctly the price function and update their beliefs accordingly. Due to the presence of noise (u), the equilibrium typically will not be fully revealing.
It is well-known (see, for instance, ch. 4 in Vives (2008)) that there is a natural game in demand schedules which implements partially revealing REE. Let traders therefore use demand schedules as strategies. Thus, once each trader has received his private information, investors submit demand schedules contingent on their private information to an auctioneer, who aggregates all the speculators' schedules. Then, the auctioneer …nds a market clearing price (as in (i ) in the previous de…nition of REE ) and, …nally, he allocates quantities to satisfy traders'demands.
Denote by
is a mapping from the set of her (his) private signals to the set of demand functions. Thus, X I i (s i ; u i ; :) is a demand function of the informed investor i corresponding to a given private information (s i ; u i ). Analogously, X U j (u j ; :) is a demand function of the uninformed investor j corresponding to a given private information u j :
: The market clearing condition implies that Z
To emphasize the dependence of the market clearing price on the strategies of speculators, we write p = p(X I ; X U ): In a Bayesian equilibrium, given his private information, each speculator chooses a demand function to maximize his conditional expected utility, taking as given the strategies of other traders and taking as given the price of the risky asset. We will restrict attention to linear symmetric Bayesian equilibria of the demand schedule game.
De…nition: A symmetric linear Bayesian equilibrium (SLE) is a Bayesian equilibrium such that the demand functions are linear and identical, that is,
where B 0 ; B 1 ; B 2 ; B 3 ; C 0 ; C 1 and C 2 are constants.
To solve for a SLE a standard approach is the following. First, positing linear strategies for the traders, we …nd, using the market clearing condition, an expression for p in terms of v + e " and u; as follows:
where
: Second, we compute the asset demands for informed and uninformed types. Third, using (1) we update beliefs about v: Finally, we identify coe¢ cients.
Next, we are interested in deriving under which conditions there exists a SLE. In order to perform this, …rst we express the coe¢ cients of the demand functions in terms of the coe¢ cients of the price function (these expressions are stated in the proof of the Proposition 1). Second, we write the coe¢ cients of the price function as functions of a ratio, = A1 A2 , and then, we characterize this ratio as a solution of a …xed-point equation. If a solution of this equation exists, then we conclude that there exists a SLE. Note that = B3 B1+(1 )C1 is the ratio of the average responsiveness to the private signal on v to the average sensitivity to the endowment shock. That is, it is roughly the ratio of how much information the price reveals about the average signal v + e " in relation to how much information about the aggregate shock u.
In a SLE, the coe¢ cients of the price function satisfy
and
and is a solution of the following …xed-point equation:
Moreover, if > 0; the existence of a SLE is guaranteed and there are at most three equilibria.
Remark:
The result related to the existence of a SLE is trivial. It follows from the fact that f (0) = " 0 and lim
Note that the previous proposition shows that the result of non-existence of a SLE for some parameter con…gurations derived in Ganguli and Yang (2009) , where = 0; is not robust. A small perturbation in this correlation coe¢ cient guarantees existence of such an equilibrium.
Strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity
In this subsection we derive the …xed-point equation given in (2) and relate the slope of the function f ( ) to the character of the strategic interaction between the investors. In particular, we analyze the relationship between the investors' optimal demands and the information provided by the price. We start by noting that, provided > 0, observing the equilibrium price of the risky asset is informationally equivalent to observing
The endogenous parameter is directly related to the informativeness of the price about the aggregate signal v + e ". Consider the informed trader i. Recall that her information set is given by fs i ; u i ; pg : This information set is informationally equivalent to the following three signals fs i ; z i ; zg:
; and z: This is so since the endowment u i helps in extracting information on v in the price (which depends on the aggregate shock u). The implication is that the price increases investor i's public information about v, through the signal z, and it increases investor i's private information about v, through the signal z i : We can decompose trader i's posterior forecast E(vjs i ; z i ; z) in a (purely) private and a public component (similarly as in Amador and Weill (2010)):
Conditional on her private information, s i and z i ; and given a fully di¤use prior, trader i forms a private posterior belief that v is normally distributed with mean and precision:
(1 )
Conditional on the public signal z, and given the common prior, trader i forms a public posterior belief that v is normally distributed with mean and precision:
Finally, conditional on her information set, the posterior belief of trader i is that v is normally distributed with mean
and precision
Note that when = 0 we have that { I = 0, and when = 1 we have that
In both cases signals are conditionally independent (in the …rst case about v and in the second case about v + e ").
Now, consider the uninformed trader j. His information set fu j ; pg is informationally equivalent to the following two signals:
and z: Performing a similar decomposition for trader j's posterior belief, we get
where !
and {
Next, using the previous decompositions, we derive an expression for the equilibrium price. Taking into account the transformations of the traders' information sets, the investors'optimal demands can be rewritten as:
Hence, the aggregate demand is given by Z 0 I E(vjs i ; z i ; z) p 1
or equivalently,
Therefore, the market clearing condition implies that
By virtue of (4) and (5), it follows that
Substituting these expressions in (7) and taking into account that E(vjz) is a linear function of p, we get that observing p is equivalent to observing
Comparing this formula with the expression of z stated in (3), we have that, in equilibrium
Taking into account the expression of aggregate demand given in (6) and the decompositions of investors'beliefs given in (4) and (5), Expression (8) shows that is a measure of sensibility of the aggregate demand in the investors'private information. Notice that if all private forecasts increase in one unit, the aggregate demand rises .
Substituting the expressions of I and U in (8), using the expressions of I ; ; and U , we get the …xed-point-equation stated in Proposition 1. The function f ( ) can be understood as an aggregate (average) best response function which yields the price informativeness, for short, out of the responses of traders to changes to initial price informativeness. There is aggregate strategic susbtitutability (complementarity) when f 0 ( ) < 0 (f 0 ( ) > 0) and a change in induces responses which decrease (increase) price informativeness. Strategic susbtitutability is the traditional case in the Grossman-Stiglitz style models.
Consider an informed investor: Using the expression of ! I , I ; I and ; we get
Notice that when increases, that is, when other investors' demands rely more on their private information, prices are more informative about v. This e¤ect rises both the precision of public information and the precision of private information I : These increases have, in general, two opposite e¤ects on the term I : 1) The increase in the precision of public information tends to decrease I ; which means that an informed trader …nds optimal to rely more on the improved public information and less on the private information. Thus, the endogenous public signal generated by prices tends to make investors' decisions strategic substitutes, when other investors'demands rely more on their private information, an informed trader has less incentives to take her private information into consideration. This is the usual e¤ect in the Grossman-Stiglitz model.
2) The increase in the precision of private information tends to increase I , which means that an informed trader …nds optimal to rely more on this improved private information. Thus, the endogenous private signal generated by prices tends to make investors'decisions strategic complements, that is, when other investors' demands rely more on their private information, an informed trader has more incentives to take her private information into consideration. This e¤ect arises out of the private learning channel of prices.
Which of the two e¤ects dominates will depend on parameter values. Specifically, we obtain
Hence, is the (squared) correlation coe¢ cient between u and u i . When is large in relation to the the correlation of private signal errors, the private learning channel from prices dominates for informed investors (and
The intuition for these results is as follows: When = 1; the price does not provide any additional information in the prediction of v to informed traders, and consequently, the individual only takes into account s i : Hence, I ; the sensibility of an informed trader's demand to her private information is independent of : By contrast, whenever < 1; the price provides extra information when predicting v. If is very large or if is very low, the expression for I tells us that I increases with ; but varies very little: This implies that the …rst e¤ect dominates, and hence,
is large, then the change of I due to an increase of beta is signi…cative and this makes the second e¤ect to dominate, which implies
Thus, for informed investors, the private learning channel from prices is important if the (squared) correlation coe¢ cient between u and u i ; u + ; is large in relation to the correlation of private signal errors.
A similar reasoning may be done for an uninformed trader since in this case 13 we get an identical expression for
:
Again an increase in rises both the precision of public information and the precision of private information I : In general, the …rst e¤ect tends to decrease U and the second e¤ect tends to increase U : However, the overall e¤ect of on U is unambiguous:
indicating that for the uninformed traders the second e¤ect always prevails. Note that even if the value of is low, we have that
The reason is that when is low, the second e¤ect is low since U varies little with respect to ; but the …rst e¤ect is also low since U varies little with respect to ; given that in this case U is low. Comparative statics of f 0 ( ) allows us to determine which parameters amplify/narrow potential strategic complementarities/substitutabilities in the actions of investors. We obtain:
Note that if = 1, sign(f 0 ( )) = sign(( ) (1 )); where = u + . For < 1 we have that f 0 ( ) > 0 if and only if > . Straightforward computations yield the following result:
c) If ( u + ) 0 (that is, when informed traders'actions are strategic complements), then
The result in a) is due to the fact that it always holds that
The result in b) follows directly from the expressions of
The second part of this corollary tells us that a change in the risk tolerance coe¢ cient ampli…es/narrows the potential strategic complementarity/substitutability in actions.
Uniqueness/multiplicity of equilibrium
In this subsection we derive su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of SLE in the general setup. In other words, we obtain su¢ cient conditions for the graph of function f ( ) and the 45-degree line to intersect once. Note that when we have (aggregate) strategic susbtitutability -the function f ( ) is decreasing ( f 0 ( ) < 0)-or when (aggregate) strategic complementarity is moderate -the 45-degree line is steeper than the function f ( ) (f 0 ( ) < 1) -, the uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed. The following corollary provides the parameter con…gurations for these two cases:
< ; then f 0 ( ) < 1 and there exists a unique SLE.
When the condition in a) holds, informed traders'actions are strategic substitutes < ; then
always holds, we get that
which warrants uniqueness of equilibrium.
From the corollary it emerges that the forces for strategic substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibrium therefore, are parameter constellations where the private learning channel for prices is weak (and we approach a situation with a unique source of asymmetric/diverse information). Those are when the fraction of informed traders is large ( high) and the correlation among the private signal errors is high ( high), or when investors almost do not hold information about the aggregate supply ( or low). The same forces together when informed investors have a low risk weighted information advantage about v ( " low) push for low strategic complementarity.
It is important to remark that all these results allows us to conclude that a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is the presence of strong strategic complementarities in actions at relevant points. However, the derivation of su¢ cient conditions on the primitives that guarantee multiplicity of equilibria in this general setup is not easy. In Section 5, we study particular cases and, then, necessary and su¢ cient for multiplicity of equilibria are obtained.
Stability
Until now, we have shown that generically a SLE exists, with the possibility of multiple equilibria. As usual in these cases, the natural question is whether there exists a plausible selection device which implies that traders coordinate on a speci…c equilibrium. A standard criteria for selecting among equilibria is stability. 10 Consider that the economy is in equilibrium. Thus, = f ( ): Suppose that there is a small perturbation in ; such that the price is informationally equivalent to v+e " 11 This leads to the following de…nition:
De…nition: A SLE is stable (unstable) if and only if its corresponding value for is a stable (unstable) …xed point for the best response function f ( ) (i.e., if and only if its corresponding value for satis…es jf 0 ( )j < 1).
Note that if f 0 ( ) > 0 and there are three (regular) equilibria (that is, for which f 0 ( ) 6 = 1) then necessarily the extremal ones are stable and the middle one unstable. If f 0 ( ) < 0 the equilibrium will be unique but may be unstable if strategic susbtitutability is strong enough (and jf 0 ( )j > 1).
Comparative statics and information acquisition
We derive some comparative statics results and apply them to analyze the incentives to acquire information about the asset payo¤.
Some comparative statics
We now analyze how some parameters a¤ect the information that the price reveals about the liquidation value and about the aggregate supply. Using the expression of the equilibrium price, we get that the informational content of the price about the liquidation value and the aggregate supply is given by
and (var(ujp))
Remark: As is independent of v ; the previous expressions tell us that
Next, we analyze the e¤ect of a change in the risk tolerance coe¢ cient and in the fraction of informed traders. Using the chain rule for a parameter &:
In order to obtain how changes with respect to & = and we have to see how f ( ) moves with and . It is easy to see that f ( ) is strictly increasing in and , that is, ceteris paribus, more risk tolerance or more informed traders make the aggregate demand to be more sensible to private information (note that the weight that informed agents put on private information is higher than the one put by uninformed ones). It follows that for regular equilibria (for which f 0 ( ) 6 = 1), sign(
It follows that for any regular equilibrium increasing or will increase except if at the equilibrium f 0 ( ) > 1 (in which case decreases). This means that for any regular equilibrium with f 0 ( ) < 1 we have that increasing or increases the informativeness of the price about the asset value in relation to the aggregate endowment shock. When f 0 ( ) > 1, the opposite happens. If > 0 there are generically either one or three regular equilibria. If = 0 we know that there are generically two regular equilibria when they exist, and the equilibrium with the highest is unstable (Ganguli and Yang (2009)).
This allows us to obtain the following result: Note that if we are on the middle unstable equilibrium of three equilibria and or increase adaptive dynamics will converge to the higher equilibrium, increasing (and this will happen even if the unstable equilibrium disappears, see Figure 1 and see the movement of f ( ) from the middle to the upper branch increasing ). When = 0 and if we are on the high unstable equilibrium, if or increases, adaptive dynamics will diverge. When > 0, if we are in a critical equilibrium and if or increase then the critical equilibrium will disappear and adaptive dynamics will settle on a higher equilibrium (see Figure 2 where the situation is illustrated by increasing from = 2:3134 to 3). We see therefore that unambiguous comparative statics results can be derived even for critical and unstable equilibria (see Vives (1990) and Echenique (2002) for general results).
Information acquisition incentives
Next, we analyze the possibility of strategic complementarity in information acquisition. Strategic complementarity (substitutability) in information acquisition means that traders have more (less) incentives to get informed as the fraction of informed traders increases. Formally, let R( ) =
; where
) and E U (W U j ) denote the ex-ante expected indirect utility of an informed trader and an uninformed trader, respectively, gross of information costs.
De…nition: A market exhibits strategic complementarity (substitutability) in information acquisition if R 0 ( ) < 0 ( R 0 ( ) > 0).
This result tells us that, similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , the value of information about the liquidation value of the risky asset is related to the square root of the ratio of the precision of uninformed traders to the precision of informed traders. It is easy to see from the expressions for U and I that sign (R 0 ( )) = sign 0 ( ) . That is, we have strategic substitutability or 19 strategic complementarity in information acquisition depending on whether an increase in the proportion of informed increases or decreases the informativeness of price (in relation to v + e "). When 0 ( ) > 0 ( 0 ( ) < 0)) increasing makes the price more informative about the payo¤ and decreases (increases) the incentives to acquire information. The result of strategic substitutability ( 0 ( ) > 0) is the one in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . From the results on comparative statics the following proposition follows.
Proposition 6: If
> 0 the market exhibits strategic substitutability in information acquisition at regular extremal equilibria. When there are three SLE, the market exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition in the equilibrium whose value of is intermediate. If = 0 the market exhibits strategic substitutability (complementarity) in information acquisition at the low (high) regular equilibrium.
The equilibria in which the market exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition are unstable. If we discard those, we are left with strategic substitutability in information acquisition as in the Grossman and Stiglitz model. Under adaptive dynamics, starting either at unstable or critical equilibria the system will converge to an equilibrium with larger and R. 12 In all cases we end up therefore with strategic substitutability in information acquisition.
This result could be modi…ed if agents could acquire information either about the payo¤ and the noisy supply together or not at all. In this case an equilibrium of the Grossman-Stiglitz type could display strategic complementarity in information acquisition for some con…guration of the precision of the signals (see Proposition 5 in Ganguli and Yang (2009) for the case = 0).
Particular cases
The general framework presented above encompasses several of the main models presented in the literature of market microstructure.
Example 1:
= 0 (a generalization of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) ).
This is the classical case of the noise trader model but generalized to allow for correlated errors in the private signals and for the presence of informed and uninformed traders. In this case
f ( ) is decreasing in and we have strategic susbtitutability. The intuition of this property is the following. In this example, as in traditional rational expectations models, uninformed traders do not hold any private information, whereas informed traders only have private information about the liquidation value of the risky asset. This has two e¤ects. First, uninformed traders'demands depend only on public information, that is, U = 0; and hence, @ U @ = 0. Second, in relation to informed traders, the precision of private information I = " (and hence, independent of ). This implies that the private learning channel e¤ect of a change in on I vanishes. Consequently, informed investors' decisions are strategic substitutes in actions, that is,
Combining these results, as f ( ) = I + (1 ) U ; it follows that f ( ) is decreasing in : The fact that the function f ( ) is decreasing leads to uniqueness of equilibrium. When there is strong strategic substitutability in actions, the function f ( ) is decreasing and it has a very steep slope. In this case the equilibrium is unstable. In the remainder situations the equilibrium is stable. These results are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 7: If = 0; a SLE exists and is unique. The equilibrium is stable if and only if Corollary 7 indicates that when takes extreme values, near 1 or near zero, the equilibrium is stable. This is due to the fact that, when the value of is extreme, the classical public learning channel e¤ect of a change in on I is moderate. Note that, when is near 0, the expression I = H( I ; ) indicates that the e¤ect of on I is small. On the other hand, when is near 1, the increase in the public precision, ; due to a rise in is small. This implies that in both cases the strategic substitutability in actions of informed traders is moderate, and hence, the equilibrium is stable.
Example 2: = 0 (Ganguli and Yang (2009)).
If the private signal errors are uncorrelated, then
f ( ) is increasing in and we have strategic complementarity. In this particular case we can explicitly obtain the equilibrium values for : 
Moreover, the equilibrium with the lowest value of is stable, whereas the other one is unstable. Heinemann (2010) . Our result coincides with the one in Chamley (2008b) . Note however that the lower equilibrium may be unstable under eductive learning for some parameter con…gurations (see Heinemann (2010) , and Guesnerie (2002) for a general overview of the concept). The lower equilibrium is always stable under adaptive learning and the higher one is not (see Heinemann (2010) ).
Corollary 8 shows that when private signals are very precise ( " and high enough) there is no equilibrium. The intuition is the following. If " is high enough, although prices are almost not informative ( low), informed investors' weights on private information, I ; and, hence, the average weight f ( ), are high. If this is combined with factors that favor strategic complementarities in actions (for instance, high enough), the result is that there is no intersection between the function f ( ) and the 45-degree line, and hence, there is no equilibrium. Finally, to illustrate the results derived in Corollary 8, we plot the following …gure: 
Before interpreting the results stated in Corollary 9, we plot several …gures illustrating the di¤erent situations when = 1. In Figure 4 , the selected parameter values satisfy ( + 8) < 0. Consistent with Corollary 9 there is a unique equilibrium. Figure 2 illustrates a particular case in which ( + 8) = 0: As Corollary 9 indicates, in this case that independent of the value of , there is a unique equilibrium. and " = 1: Figure 5 shows that when the parameter takes the critical values, and ; there are two equilibria. Figure 1 shows that when = 2 ; , there is a unique equilibrium, whereas when 2 ;
there are three equilibria. The intuition of the results is as follows. Notice that if = 1, the price does not provide any extra information about v to informed traders, and consequently, informed investors only take into account their private signal about v. Hence, I does not vary with . If is high enough or is low enough (because of is low or u is high), on aggregate, strategic complementarities in actions are moderate and this leads to a unique equilibrium. Otherwise, if is low enough or is high enough, then the number of equilibria will depend on the investors'risk tolerance coe¢ cient : Generically, there are three possibilities: 1) When is very high ( > ), strategic complementarities are very strong and the function f ( ) has a sharply increasing S-shape. It has a unique intersection with the 45-degree line in the upper branch of the S, and consequently, uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2) For a middle value of ( 2 ; ), the S-shape rises more slowly and we get 3 intersections, and consequently, three equilibria.
3) If is very low ( < ), strategic complementarities in actions are moderate. Hence, the function f ( ) is increasing, but very ‡at. Consequently, there is a unique intersection, and hence, a unique equilibrium.
With regard to the stability of equilibria, since f 0 ( ) > 0 we know that regular extremal equilibria are stable and whenever there are three equilibria the middle one is unstable. In case of two SLE, there is one stable equilibrium and one unstable equilibrium (with f 0 ( ) = 1). Note that there can be a single equilibrium and be unstable (as in the middle branch in Figure 2 ). Example 4: = 1 (all the investors are informed about the liquidation value).
We have that
where = u + ; and sign(f 0 ( )) = sign(( ) (1 )). For < 1 we have that f 0 ( ) > 0 if and only if > . That is, if the (squared) correlation coe¢ cient between u and u i is large in relation to the correlation of private signal errors, then the private learning channel from prices dominates for informed investors (
Corollary 10: Suppose that = 1: If ( ) (1 ) 0, then f 0 ( ) < 0 and there is a unique SLE. Otherwise, if 9 < 0; there is a unique SLE, if 9 > 0 and > ; there is a unique SLE, if 9 > 0 and < ; there is a unique SLE, if 9 > 0 and = or = ; there are two SLE, if 9 > 0 and 2 ; ; there are three SLE, if 9 = 0, there is a unique SLE, where
Again, in order to illustrate results stated in Corollary 10, we plot several …gures. The parameters values used in Figure 6 satisfy ( ) (1 ) 0 and consistently with Corollary 10, investors'decisions are strategic substitutes, f ( ) is decreasing, and there is a unique equilibrium. 
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In Figure 7 , the selected parameter values satisfy 9 = 0: As Corollary 10 indicates, whenever 9 = 0; independent of the value of , there is a unique equilibrium. In Figure 8 , the parameter takes the critical values, and : In these cases there are two equilibria. For all > ( < ); the graph of f ( ) is located above (below) the dotted (solid) curve, and we get a unique intersection with the 45-degree line. For all 2 ; ; the graph of f ( ) is located between the solid and the dotted curve and we will have three intersections with the 45-degree line. This is illustrated in Figure 9 , assuming that = 0:5; = 0:7 and = 1. From the last two …gures, we obtain that: 1) When is very high ( > ), strategic complementarities in actions are very strong and the function f ( ) has a sharply increasing S-shape. It has a unique intersection with the 45-degree line in the upper branch of the S, and consequently, uniqueness of the equilibrium.
2) For a middle value of ( 2 ; ), the S-shape rises more slowly and we get 3 intersections, and consequently, three equilibria. 1) If is very low ( < ), strategic complementarities in actions are moderate. Hence, the function f ( ) is increasing but very ‡at. Consequently, it has a unique intersection, and hence, uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Let us examine the stability of equilibria.
Corollary 11: Suppose that = 1, 0 < < 1 and > 0: a) If
; we have strategic complementarity, regular extremal equilibria are stable and whenever there are three equilibria the middle one is unstable. In case of two SLE, there is one stable equilibrium and one unstable equilibrium (with f 0 ( ) = 1). b) If < , we have strategic susbtitutability and b.1) if < 9 ; the unique equilibrium is stable. b.2) if > 9 ; then we have two possibilities if = 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) ; the equilibrium is stable,
; the equilibrium is unstable, where
The results in this section con…rm the forces (parameter constellations) for strategic substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibrium therefore. Those are when the fraction of informed traders is large ( high) and the correlation among the private signal errors is high ( high), or when investors almost do not hold information about the aggregate supply ( low). The same forces together when informed investors have a low risk weighted information advantage about v ( " low) push for low strategic complementarity. To those we add the case where informed investors have a very precise information about v ( " very high).
Concluding remarks
This paper suggests that the type of information observed by market participants a¤ects the existence and the number of partially revealing rational expectations equilibria. Strong strategic complementarities in the actions of investors are the driver of multiplicity of equilibria. A necessary condition for multiplicity of equilibria is the presence of multiple sources of asymmetric information, leading to a private learning channel from public signals. This channel induces strategic complementarities in the actions of investors and when it is strong enough it overpowers the classical e¤ect of more public information implying less weight on private signals, leading to strategic substitutability in actions.
Several extensions are left for future research. A …rst one is to develop the welfare analysis in our market. A second one is to explore the dynamic implications of the model. A third one is to develop the analysis in a framework with strategic traders instead of price-taking ones.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the informed trader i: Suppose that this agent conjectures the functional form of the price given by (1) . The maximization problem of this investor is Substituting these expressions in the objective function and maximizing with respect to x I i ; the …rst order condition implies that
Applying standard normal theory, we have
Substituting these expressions into (9), we get
Consider now the uninformed trader j. Suppose that this agent conjectures that the price has the functional form given in (1) . The maximization problem of this investor is max
which is equivalent to the following maximization problem:
Using the expression of the …nal wealth of this agent, we have
Substituting these expressions in the objective function and maximizing with respect to x U j ; the …rst order condition implies that
Again applying standard normal theory, we get
Plugging these expressions into (10), we have
Using the optimal demands for all investors, the market clearing condition implies that
Equating coe¢ cients according to (1)
Using the expressions of the coe¢ cients B's and C's, we have where
; and c 0 = Concerning the expression of A 1 ; notice that substituting the expression of I and U in 1
and operating, we get
+ (1 )
Substituting this expression in the RHS of the previous equality and operating, we get 1
In relation to the expression of A 0 ; note that isolating A 0 from (11), operating taking into account the expressions of A 1 and A 2 ; we get the desired formula for A 0 .
Finally, concerning the upper bound for the number of SLE, we have that the number of SLE is the same as the number of the roots of the polynomial P ( ): Notice that if is either 0 or 1, then P ( ) has degree two or three. Therefore, the result is trivial. Suppose that 6 = 0; 1: By virtue of Rolle's Theorem, to show the result it is enough to prove that there exists a unique such that P 00 ( ) = 0: Di¤erentiating we have P 00 ( ) = 20c 5 3 + 12c 4 2 + 6c 3 + 2c 2 and P 000 ( ) = 60c 5 2 + 24c 4 + 6c 3 :
We distinguish three cases:
. In this case P 000 ( ) hasn't real roots. The fact that c 3 > 0 implies that P 000 ( ) > 0 for all ; and consequently, P 00 ( ) is strictly increasing. Moreover, since lim ! 1 P 00 ( ) = 1 and lim !+1 P 00 ( ) = +1; we conclude that in this case P 00 ( ) has a unique real root. Case 2: 2 2 (1 ) " 2 = 5 (2 ) ( u + ) : In this case P 000 ( ) has a unique real root, denoted by 0 . The fact that c 3 > 0 implies that P 000 ( ) > 0 for all 6 = 0 ; and consequently, P 00 ( ) is strictly increasing for all 6 = 0 . As before, since lim P 00 ( ) = +1; we conclude that in this case P 00 ( ) has a unique real root.
In this case P 000 ( ) has two real roots, given by: (2 ) 10 (1 ) ( u + )
where 1 is a local maximum of P 00 ( ): Using the fact that " > 5(2 )( u + ) 2 2 (1 ) 2 ; and after some tedious computations, we obtain that P 00 ( 1 ) < 0: Hence, we have that P 00 ( ) has a unique root.
Proof of Proposition 3: a) In order to prove uniqueness, it su¢ ces to show that the inequality given in the statement of the corollary guarantees that the function f ( ) is decreasing for all 0: Doing some computations we have that f 0 ( ) 0 is equivalent to
; or using the expression of ;
: The expression in the LHS of this inequality is a decreasing function in ; whenever 0: Hence, we get that
Thus, if the inequality 1 (
holds, we can assure that f ( ) is decreasing for all 0:
Hence, = Next, we state a lemma that will be applied in the proof of Corollary 5.
Lemma A.1. Let z N (0; ) and W = c + b0z + z0Az, where c 2 R, b 2 R n , and A is an n n matrix. Then, if 1 + 2 A is positive de…nite, then
Proof. See Danthine and Moresi (1993) .
Proof of Corollary 5: First, we want to derive the ex-ante expected utility function for an uninformed trader. Recall that the combination of CARA utility functions and the normality assumption implies that
Using the expression of the …nal wealth of this agent and (10), we have
Using the expression of E(vju j ; p) and U ; the previous conditional expected utility can be written as:
Conditional on u j ; z 1 is normally distributed with zero mean and variance
Since 1 + 2A > 0; we can apply the Lemma A.1 and operating, using the expression of U ; we get
Hence, the ex-ante expected utility function for the uninformed trader is given by
Performing similar computations as before, we obtain that the ex-ante expected utility function for an informed trader is given by
Using the fact that u i and u j are identically distributed, from the previous equality and ( 14) , it follows that R( ) = U I
1=2
Proof of Proposition 6: Using Corollary 5, the expressions of U , I and the chain rule, we have
Since in equilibrium > 0, it follows that sign(R 0 ( )) = sign( 0 ( )). In an equilibrium f ( ) = 0:When the equilibrium is regular, we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem and we get
Proof of Corollary 7: Using the expression of f ( ); we get that, when (1 ) = 0; f ( ) is a constant function, and obviously, in this case there is one equilibrium and it is stable. Suppose now that (1 ) 6 = 0: In this case f ( ) is a decreasing function. Taking into account this fact, and that f (0) > 0 and lim !1 f ( ) = 0; it follows that the equilibrium is unique. Concerning to stability of the equilibrium notice that, di¤erentiating f ( ) and evaluating at the …xed point, we Proof of Corollary 8: When = 0; we have
or equivalently, P ( ) = 2 + " = 0: Notice that P ( ) is a polynomial of degree 2 in . Therefore, we can explicitly compute the roots of this polynomial. If 1 < 4 " 2 ; the polynomial P ( ) has no real roots and, hence, we conclude that a SLE does not exist. Otherwise, that is, if 1 4 " 2 ; then 1 and 2 are the roots of P ( ); whose expressions are given in the statement of this corollary.
In relation to stability, straightforward computations yield 0 < f 0 ( 1 ) < 1 and f 0 ( 2 ) > 1: Consequently, the equilibrium with the lowest value of is stable and the other equilibrium is unstable. Notice that if (1 ) = 0; then the equilibrium is unique since f ( ) is constant. Suppose that (1 ) 6 = 0: From the …xed-point equation, we have that in a solution of the …xed-point equation
Substituting this expression in the formula of f 0 ( ); we get
We wonder under which conditions there exists a …xed point such that f 0 ( ) = 1: Let z = 2 ; the previous equality is equivalent to
The polynomial in the LHS has a discriminant equal to 2 (1 ) ( 8 + ) : We distinguish two cases: 1) 8 + < 0 and 2) ( 8 + ) 0:
Case 1: 8 + < 0: In this case the discriminant is negative. Hence, z 2 ( ) + z ( 2 ) 2 < 0 for all z: This implies that in any …xed point f 0 ( ) < 1: Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium is unique. 
We wonder under which conditions there exists a …xed point such that f 0 ( ) = 1 Let z = 2 ; the previous equality is equivalent to
The polynomial in the LHS has a discriminant equal to 2 ( 1) 2 ( 9 ) ( ) : We distinguish two cases: 1) 9 < 0; and 2) 9 0:
Case 1: 9 < 0: In this case the discriminant is negative. Hence,
2 z 2 ( 1) 2 < 0 for all z. This implies that in any …xed point f 0 ( ) < 1: Consequently, the equilibrium is unique. 1) in case of uniqueness of the SLE, generically 0 f 0 ( ) < 1 at the equilibrium; which implies that the equilibrium is stable.
2) in case of two SLE, 0< f 0 ( ) < 1 in one equilibrium and f 0 ( ) = 1 in the other equilibrium. This implies that there is one stable equilibrium and one unstable equilibrium.
3) in case of three SLE, 0 < f 0 ( ) < 1 in the two equilibria with extreme values of , whereas f 0 ( ) > 1 in the equilibrium with the intermediate value of . Hence, the two …rst equilibria are stable and the last one is unstable.
Suppose now that > : In this case f 0 ( ) < 0; and therefore, there is a unique equilibrium. The stability of the …xed point requires that f 0 ( ) < 1: Direct computations yield that this inequality is equivalent to k( ) > 0; (19) where k(b) = 2 +b 4 ( 1) 2 +b 2 (1 ) ( + 3 ) : We distinguish 3 cases: 1) < < 9 ; 2) = 9 ; and 3) 1 > > 9 : Case 1: < < 9 : In this case the polynomial k(x); where x = b 2 ; has a negative discriminant and, consequently, it does not have any real root. In all values the polynomial is positive, and in particular, in the …xed point. This implies that (19) holds. Hence, we get that the equilibrium is stable. On the other hand, the inequality b < f (b) is equivalent to g( ) < 1;
where g( ) = Then, taking into account that = ( u + ) ; we obtain -for all < 1 = 1 u + ; 1 < g( ) < g( ); and hence, we conclude that the equilibrium is stable, -for all > 2 = 2 u + ; g( ) < g( ) < 1; and hence, we conclude that the equilibrium is stable, and -for all 2 [ 1 ; 2 ] ; g( ) 1 g( ); and hence, we conclude that the equilibrium is unstable.
